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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent : 
v. : 
PAUL WOOLLEY : Case No. 920477-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Rule 
26(2)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. 
S78-2a-3(2)(d). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Statutes and Constitutional Provisions are provided in 
Addendum A: 
U.S. Constitution Amendment V 
U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7, Salt Lake City 
Ordinance §11-08-020. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Were the statements made by plaintiff-respondent during 
opening statements asking the jury to consider the role of the 
government and what it means to the jury prejudicial amounting to 
prosecutorial misconduct? 
2. Was there insufficient evidence to establish that the 
defendant committed a battery? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Following a jury trial held on June 22, 1992, a four person 
jury convicted appellant of Battery, a Class B misdemeanor. 
Appellant was sentenced the same day to serve six months in the Salt 
Lake County Jail, forthwith, with credit for time served previously 
related to this offense. This appeal arises out of that judgment 
and conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A jury trial was held on June 22, 1992. During open 
statement the City Prosecutor informed the four person jury that she 
represents the government. At that point the prosecutor then asked 
the jury to, "stop and think about what the government means to 
you. Particularly in a case like this." T.3. The prosecutor then 
added that the government represents the jury. At that point an 
objection was made by defense counsel. A side bar was requested and 
after the side bar, the trial judge sustained the objection. The 
prosecutor continued her opening by stating that she represents Salt 
Lake City and that she is alone at counsel table. 
After Defense Counsel made her opening statement, the city 
called three witnesses; Mr. Sammy Knighton, Mr. Albert Ortega, and 
Miss Juanita Valdez. Mr. Knighton was the first witness called. He 
stated that he was with the victim, Miss Valdez, they had exited a 
UTA bus near Indiana and 1500 West. Mr. Knighton testified that he 
and Miss Valdez exited the bus and proceeded to walk home. He had 
noticed someone was behind them but could not say for sure who it 
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was. Mr. Knighton stated that once he and Miss Valdez reached the 
driveway of her home, the defendant/appellant, Mr. Woolley, 
approached from behind and without provocation knocked Miss Valdez 
to the ground and hit her on the left side of the face. T.7-8. 
Mr. Knighton further testified that Miss Valdez was walking on his 
left side and was to his left when she was struck from behind. 
T.12. 
Mr. Ortega was then called as the City's second witness. 
He testified that he was inside his home when the incident occurred, 
and that Mr. Knighton came running in the house saying someone had 
just hit Miss Valdez. Mr. Ortega stated he ran outside and saw an 
individual leaving the yard about 50 feet away. He confronted this 
person, but this person looked at him with a mean and blank 
expression. T.15. At that point, Mr. Ortega told Mr. Knighton to 
call the police, and the person left. T.16. Mr. Ortega then 
proceeded to go to work and saw this individual heading toward a 
yellow house. He stopped and the individual yelled out that he was 
calling the police. T.16-17. Mr. Ortega waited for the police and 
told them how Mr. Woolley battered Miss Valdez. T.17. Mr. Ortega 
also informed the police that Miss Valdez was struck on the left 
side of the face. T.17-18. 
Miss Valdez was then called to the stand. She related to 
the jury how she exited the UTA bus and was suddenly struck by Mr. 
Woolley on the right side of her face. T.20-22. She also indicated 
to the jury that she was on the left side of Mr. Knighton when this 
occurred. T.22. All three witnesses positively identified Mr. 
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Woolley as the person who struck Miss Valdez at the scene of the 
incident and also identified Mr. Woolley at trial.1 
Mr. Woolley took the stand in his own defense. He related 
that he had been on the same UTA bus with Miss Valdez and Mr. 
Knighton. T.23-34. He stated that when the bus came to a stop, 
Miss Valdez and Mr. Knighton were slow to exit and slow walking down 
the street. T.24. Mr. Woolley indicated to the jury that he was 
angry because he was late, but that he was angry at himself. T.24, 
27. Mr. Woolley testified that he walked around Miss Valdez and Mr. 
Knighton and proceeded on his way. T.24, 27. He then noticed two 
men were following him as he walked away. He sped up his pace in an 
effort to get away. The men followed him at which point Mr. Woolley 
was frightened because his brother had been robbed in that area, so 
he ran to a neighbor's house to call the police. T.24-25. 
At the closed of the defense case, the prosecutor recalled 
Mr. Knighton to the stand. Mr. Knighton testified to the 
inconsistencies between his and Miss Valdez1s testimony on which 
side of the face Miss Valdez was hit. T.29. Mr. Knighton recanted 
his testimony that Miss Valdez was on the left side of him but was 
insistent that she was hit on the left side of her face. T.29, 34. 
Mr. Knighton further testified he may be confused on this issue but 
was certain Mr. Woolley did strike Miss Valdez. 
The case was submitted to the jury and the jury found Mr. 
Woolley guilty of Battery. The Honorable Michael L. Hutchings 
1
 It should be noted that both Miss Valdez and Mr. 
Knighton are slightly handicapped with minor learning disabilities. 
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sentenced Mr. Woolley to 6 months in the Salt Lake County Jail 
forthwith with credit for time already served. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The statements made by the city prosecutor during opening 
statement asking the jury to consider the role of the government and 
what it means to the jury was prejudicial and violated Mr. Woolley1s 
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 
The purpose of opening statements is to aprise the jury of 
what counsel intends to prove in its case in chief. The statements 
made by the city prosecutor were entirely inappropriate and was a 
deliberate attempt to bias the jury against Mr. wooley, thereby 
violating his right to have a trial by an impartial jury. The 
statements were an attempt to sway the jury away from the 
presumption of innocence and shifted the burden of proof on the 
defense and were, in itself, insermountable prosecutorial 
misconduct. Furthermore, there was insufficient evidence to 
establish that Mr. Woolley committed the crime of Battery when the 
testimony given by the city's three witnesses was too inconsistent 
as to which side of the face Miss Valdez was struck. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STATEMENTS MADE BY THE CITY PROSECUTOR DURING OPENING 
STATEMENTS ASKING THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE ROLE OF 
GOVERNMENT AND WHAT IT MEANS TO THE JURY WAS 
PREJUDICIAL AND AMOUNTS TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
The purpose of opening statement is to aprise the jury of 
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what counsel intends to prove when presenting the case-in-chief. 
State v. Williamsy 656 P.2d 450 (Utah 1982). The primary purpose of 
any opening statement is to provide familiarity and a general 
overview for the jury about the case. 
In the case at hand, the city prosecutor, in opening 
statement, asked the jury to consider the role of the government and 
what it meant to each juror. Such a statement has no bearing on 
providing a general overview to the jury and would have no effect 
other than to prejudice the jury. However, the sole question before 
this Court is whether the remarks made by counsel were so 
objectionable as to merit a reversal. 
In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984) the Utah Supreme 
Court upheld a two prong standard set out in State v. Valdez, 513 
P.2d 422 (Utah 1973). The standard provides that to merit reversal, 
the remarks must, (1) call to the attention of the jury, matters 
which they would not be justified in considering in determining 
their verdict and, (2) under the circumstances of the particular 
case, influence the jury. See, State v. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. 
State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 35 (Utah 1992). 
In applying step one, it is evident that the prosecutor was 
calling attention to matters outside the evidence in referring to 
the government and what the government means to the jury. The role 
of the government and what it means to the jury has no place for 
consideration when a jury deliberates to reach a verdict. The only 
effect that such statements could have is to suggest to the jury 
that they owe the City of Salt Lake, through its prosecutor, a 
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special duty for what the city does for itfs residence, thereby 
creating bias for the prosecutor and in the least shifting the 
burden of proof to the defense. Thus, it is apparent that step one 
has been clearly met in that these comments provide no information 
for the jury of what the prosecutor intended to prove in its 
case-in-chief. 
Step two requires that the comments probably influenced the 
jury. Step two is more difficult to answer and involves 
consideration of the totality of all the circumstances in each 
case. In making such a consideration the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that the evidence of defendant's guilt must be closely 
scrutinized. Troy at 486. 
In State v. Troy, the Court held that in cases where the 
proof of a defendant's guilt is not strong, the Court must closely 
scrutinize the misconduct of the prosecutor. 
If the circumstances of the jurors is based on their 
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible 
of different interpretations, there is a greater 
likelihood that they will be improperly influenced 
through remarks of counsel, ...in such cases, the 
jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing and 
interpreting the evidence. They may be especially 
susceptible to influence, and a small degree of 
influence may be sufficient to affect the verdict. 
Id. See also State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
35. 
In the case before this Court, there was not compelling 
proof of defendant's guilt. The City's three witnesses were in 
direct conflict with one another and the facts, as laid out at 
trial, were susceptible to different interpretations, making the 
prosecutor's comments more likely to influence the jury. Mr. 
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Knighton originally testified that Miss Valdez was walking next to 
his left side and that she was struck on the left side of her face. 
However, Miss Valdez insisted that she was struck on the right side 
of the face while she was standing on Mr. Knighton's left side. If 
this is accurate, it would be virtually impossible to strike Miss 
Valdez on the right side of the face, from behind, without hitting 
Mr. Knighton. This testimony is perplexing at best and in the 
least, confused the jury, therefore, the likelihood that the 
prosecutor's comments, although small in degree, may have 
sufficiently influenced the jury in reaching their verdict. Since 
the evidence of the actual battery was in conflict, it is probable 
that the jury was influenced by the prosecutor's opening 
statements. Even though the trial court attempted to correct the 
error, the potential harm and the probability of influence was too 
great to correct and the damage to Mr. Woolley's trial was 
complete. 
This damage, done by the prosecutor's statements, violated 
Mr. Woolley's right to a fair trial and to due process of law as 
guaranteed by the United States and Utah Constitution. U.S. 
Constitution, amendments V and XIV, Utah Constitution, article 1, S 
13. 
The United States Constitution in amendments V and XIV as 
well as article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, provides 
that each individual is entitled to the due process of law. The 
statements made by the prosecutor made it virtually impossible for 
Mr. Woolley to receive due process of law during his trial. 
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Accordingly, the case at hand meets the two prong test and the case 
should be remanded for a new trial. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONS/ICT THE 
DEFENDANT OF BATTERY. 
It is well established that in order to reverse a jury's 
conviction for insufficient evidence, the evidence, taken in light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict , must be sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbably that reasonable minds must 
have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 433, (Utah 1983). 
In Petree, the Court concluded that once evidence is drawn 
in the light most favorable to the verdict, it is the reviewing 
court's obligation to "stretch evidentiary fabric as far as it will 
go...But this does not mean the court can take a speculated leap 
across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict." Ij3. at 445. 
See also State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991). In other words, 
the evidence against the defendant must cover any gap between the 
presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See State v. Boone, 810 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah App. 1991). 
The query now becomes whether the City presented sufficient 
evidence from which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed a battery. Defendant was convicted under 
Salt Lake City ordinance §11.08.020 which provides: 
A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or 
violence upon the person of another. 
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In an effort to "marshal the evidence," appellant brings to 
this Court the following facts. The City Prosecutor called three 
witnesses to present it's case-in-chief. Mr. Knighton, who 
testified he was next to the victim when the incident occurred, 
stated that Miss Valdez, the victim, was walking on his left hand 
side when the defendant approached from behind and struck her on the 
left side of the face. T.8, 12. 
Mr. Ortega, the victim's stepbrother, also testified that 
he confronted a man who he identified as the defendant, and asked 
him why he had hit his sister on the left side of her face. T.15, 
18. 
The victim, Miss Valdez, testified that she and Mr. 
Knighton were walking home from the bus stop when the defendant came 
up from behind on her left side and hit her on the right side of her 
jaw. T.21-22. 
Appellant contends that this evidence was insufficient to 
sustain a conviction. The testimony given at trial by the three 
witnesses was too inconsistent to constitute a conviction beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Appellant contends that due to the conflict with 
the victim's testimony and the other two witnesses that she was 
struck on the right side of the face rather than the left side, that 
it would be unreasonable for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Woolley committed a battery. Since such 
contradictory testimony existed at trial, there does exist a 
substantial gap between the presumption of innocence and the proof 
of guilt. 
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Viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, it is evident, by the contradictory statements, that the 
evidence is inconclusive and inherently improbable to the degree 
that no reasonable mind could have logically concluded that Mr. 
Woolley committed the crime of battery. Therefore, appellant moves 
this court to reverse and remand these proceedings back to the lower 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, appellant, Paul 
Woolley, respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction 
and remand this case for a new trial or dismissal. 
DATED this lj day of December, 1992. 
V ^ n «^*g / l /r\ tiflKAUt 
CARLOS A. ESQUEDA^ 
Attorney for Appellant 
^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, CARLOS A. ESQUEDA, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and four copies to the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office, 
451 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this O day of 
December, 1992 
L^^P ^^ 
CARLOS A. ESQUEDA 
~-7--y,ft A «-., s* 




£0j>{¥ [Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
f\{| 5T clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, rmless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Section 
X. (Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protec-
tion.] 
2. (Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
£ (Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. (Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be 
paid.] 
5. (Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — 
Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
•rns of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
aiizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U*»V k»»4. it*. I St.! 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. 1886 
